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wrong side of the labor pool. as a result, 
the youth unemployment rate is already 
nearly double the overall rate and labor 
participation rates are lower as well. Yet, 
there are still “serious” policymakers who 
ignore this evidence and proclaim that a 
teenager in the rural South should be paid 
the same wage as one in Scarsdale, N.Y. 
This lunacy is naturally lost during the 
tired debate over wage controls. 
Conclusion / The rise of millennials, who 
now outnumber baby boomers, should be 
treated as the start of a new chapter for the 
nation. Yet, as furchtgott-Roth and Myer 
demonstrate, state and federal policies rou-
tinely disfavor the young. as the first gen-
eration in history with a risk of enjoying a 
lower standard of living than their parents, 
there are tremendous risks for the nation 
and for economic liberty if they falter. 
The Case for ‘Misbehavior’
✒■Review By DaviD R. HenDeRson
University of Chicago economist Richard H. Thaler, probably the most important founder of “behavioral economics,” is a fantastic storyteller. In his latest book, Misbehaving, he tells, 
roughly chronologically, of his initial doubts about the standard econ-
omist’s “rational actor” model and how those doubts led him to set his
research agenda for the next 40 years. In 
chapter after chapter, he tells of anoma-
lies—bits of evidence that are inconsistent, 
sometimes wildly so—with the various 
economic models and of his debates with 
the proponents of those models. In Thal-
er’s telling, he always won the debates. 
One would expect him to say that, but as 
someone who did not start out on his side 
of the debates, I think he often did win.
One disclosure: In 1975, about the time 
he was coming up with his list of doubts, I 
became an assistant professor of econom-
ics at the University of Rochester’s business 
school, where Thaler was also an assistant 
professor. We overlapped for my first three 
years at Rochester, until he moved on to 
Cornell. That disclosure probably does not 
matter, except for the fact that I saw close-
up how he developed his ideas in the face 
of a fair amount of hostility from some 
of his colleagues. I was skeptical, but not 
hostile.
In a review of this length, it’s impossible 
to cover all of the topics Thaler discusses. 
So I’ll focus on five: the endowment effect, 
his quest for other scholars who were inter-
ested in the same ideas, financial econo-
mists’ efficient market hypothesis (EMH), 
various methods employers use to affect 
their employees’ saving for retirement, and 
the question of whether mistakes get small 
when the stakes get large.
Homo economicus and homo sapiens / at 
the start of the book, Thaler distinguishes 
between “Econs” and “Humans.” Econs 
are the rational economic actors who 
can easily figure out which deal is better, 
are never misled by the order in which 
alternatives are presented, always ignore 
sunk costs, etc. His Humans are people 
who make every imaginable mistake and 
who, he claims, are actually representa-
tive of most people. Time and again when 
discussing various issues, he reminds us 
what Econs would do and compares that 
to what actual humans (notice the small 
“h”) do. The contrast is often large.
Consider what he calls the endowment 
effect. In laying out the effect, Thaler pres-
ents the results of two versions of a ques-
tion he asks his students. In version a, he 
tells them that they have been exposed to 
a rare disease that they have a 1 in 1,000 
chance of contracting. If they get the dis-
ease, they will die within a week. They can 
take an antidote now that, with certainty, 
will prevent death. How much, he asks, 
are they willing to pay for the antidote? a 
typical answer is $2,000. 
Then he presents the same students with 
version B, telling them that they can choose 
whether or not to enter a room in which 
they will have a 1 in 1,000 chance of get-
ting that same disease. The question: how 
much do they have to be paid to be willing 
to enter the room? The answer should be 
something close to $2,000, possibly a little 
higher to reflect what economists call the 
“wealth effect”: if they are paid to accept a 
small risk, they are slightly wealthier than 
if they must pay to avoid a small risk. But 
the typical answer? $500,000. Thaler calls 
this phenomenon the endowment effect 
because, he explains, “the stuff you own 
is part of your endowment” and “people 
valued things that were already part of their 
endowment more highly than things that 
could be part of their endowment.” He gives 
numerous other examples that, I suspect, 
will ring true with most readers. 
Search for others / In the mid-1970s, after 
coming up with his list of the kinds of 
human behavior that are at odds with 
the economic model of rational behavior, 
Thaler set out to find other people working 
on the same sort of issues. a large part of 
his book is about that quest. I remember 
when he started the quest shortly after I 
arrived at the University of Rochester, and I 
remember thinking—and I still think—that 
he had a lot of courage in marching to the 
tune of a very different drum. 
as mentioned, Thaler is a great story-
teller. His tales of how he met some of the 
other key players in behavioral social sci-
ence—Daniel Kahneman, who later won 
the Nobel Memorial Prize in economics 
for his work, amos Tversky, who died early 
but probably would have shared the Nobel, 
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and others—are enjoyable and occasionally 
inspiring. 
EMH / When Thaler and I were both at the 
University of Rochester, it was one of the 
top schools in finance. One of the main 
players there was Michael Jensen, whose 
hero was the great financial economist 
Eugene fama, under whom Jensen had 
done his dissertation. You couldn’t be 
around there for long without getting 
somewhat steeped in the financial litera-
ture. The dominant view in finance then 
was the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), 
according to which stock prices incorpo-
rate all public information because if they 
didn’t, investors could gain by selling over-
priced stocks short or by buying and hold-
ing underpriced stocks. 
That view made complete sense to me. 
after all, with millions of dollars of their 
own wealth on the line, wouldn’t investors 
be the paragons of rationality? The problem, 
as Thaler learned over the years, is that there 
are many anomalies. He discusses the most 
important ones. One is that stock prices 
are “too” variable. If prices are based on 
fundamentals, how could stock prices have 
fallen an average of 20 percent on “Black 
Monday,” October 19, 1987, based on no 
apparent news? also, if investors are ratio-
nal, why would they settle for buying shares 
in firms that pay dividends? 
The favorable tax treatment 
of capital gains—capital 
gains are taxed at a lower rate 
and only when they are real-
ized—should mean that firms 
owned by Econs should never 
pay dividends.
Interestingly, fama and 
his University of Chicago co-
author Ken french altered 
their model of stock prices 
in response to the evidence, 
bringing in two other fac-
tors—company size and value. 
They claimed that those fac-
tors would make both “value 
stocks”—those whose share 
prices appear low relative to 
their earnings—and small-
company stocks riskier and, thus, earn 
higher returns. But, notes Thaler, “fama 
and french were forthright in conced-
ing that they did not have any theory to 
explain why size and value should be risk 
factors.” Moreover, notes Thaler, a paper 
by financial economists Josef lakonishok, 
andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny found 
that value stocks are not riskier. 
Retirement saving / Thaler has also been a 
leader on the issue of saving for retirement, 
based on his taking account of humans 
as they are and not as economists usually 
model them. He points out that if everyone 
were an Econ, it wouldn’t matter whether 
employers’ default option was not to sign 
up their employees for tax-advantaged 
retirement accounts or to sign them all up 
and let employees opt out. Because signing 
up and signing to get out are both so low-
cost relative to the stakes involved, either 
option should lead to the same percentage 
of employees taking advantage 
of the program. But that’s not 
what happens. Thaler cites 
research by Brigitte Madrian 
of Harvard’s Kennedy School 
of Government showing that 
before a company she studied 
had tried automatic enroll-
ment, 49 percent of employees 
joined the plan. When enroll-
ment became the default, 84 
percent of employees stayed 
enrolled.
High-stakes mistakes / One 
of the arguments that econ-
omists often make against 
Thaler’s view of humans is 
that most of his evidence 
comes from low-stakes situa-
tions in which the gains from being ratio-
nal are not large. However, they assert, 
when the gains are large, humans tend to 
be much more careful. But, using evidence 
from the National football league’s entry 
draft, Thaler makes a strong argument 
against this view. 
Nfl teams are multi-multi-million-
dollar enterprises, and their draft picks 
represent multi-million-dollar decisions. 
Surely, if there is strong evidence of ratio-
nality, it would be in the Nfl. But Thaler 
shows that Nfl owners 
and managers seem to 
make poor draft deci-
sions. 
for instance, he dis-
cusses the considerable 
evidence that teams 
are better off “trading 
down”—that is, swap-
ping a single early-round draft pick for 
multiple later picks—and trading away a 
draft pick this year for multiple picks in 
future drafts. Yet, few teams employ those 
strategies. He even tells of a conversation 
he had about these issues with Dan Snyder, 
owner of the Washington Redskins, which 
led Snyder to send two of his top man-
agers to talk to Thaler and his colleague 
Cade Massey. Their subsequent draft picks 
showed that they ignored Thaler’s advice. 
and, as anyone who follows the Redskins 
knows, they paid dearly, highlighted by 
the bonanza of high-round draft choices 
they traded away for a single pick in 2012, 
which they used to draft Robert Griffin III. 
There is one major discordant note in 
this otherwise solid book: Thaler’s evalu-
ation of the work of economist John lott, 
who once offered a critique of Thaler’s 
work at a University of Chicago workshop. 
(I’m not claiming that lott’s critique was 
sound.) Thaler writes of lott’s book, More 
Guns, Less Crime: “as the title suggests, the 
thesis of the book is that if we just made 
sure every american was armed at all times, 
no one would dare commit a crime.” That 
is not the thesis of lott’s book, which is 
much more nuanced. (See “Torturing the 
Data?” Winter 2010–2011.) although 
Thaler is generally good at presenting the 
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If everyone were an “Econ,” it wouldn’t 
matter what the employer’s default 
option is for signing up employees to a 
tax-advantaged retirement plan.
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ideas of economists who disagree with 
him, he did a poor job with lott’s views.
Conclusion / assuming that we are per-
suaded of many of Thaler’s claims, what 
are their implications for government pol-
icy? He sees many. He and his then–Uni-
versity of Chicago colleague Cass Sunstein 
co-authored their 2008 book, Nudge, about 
such implications. Unlike many critics, as I 
explained in my review of the book (“a less 
Oppressive Paternalism,” Summer 2008), 
I do find merit in some of their proposals 
grounded in “libertarian paternalism,” a 
term they coined. Given the latest Supreme 
Court decision on same-sex marriage, one 
of their proposals—getting the government 
out of marriage altogether—has become 
even more relevant. 
But Thaler and Sunstein drastically 
understate the problems that arise because 
the people in government doing the nudg-
ing are also Humans, not Econs. and 
bureaucrats have generally bad incentives 
to nudge in the “right” direction. On this 
point, I laid out my criticisms in more detail 
in my review of Sunstein’s 2013 book, Sim-
pler (“Simpler? Really?” fall 2013.)
Thaler answers that he and Sunstein 
“went out of our way to say that if the gov-
ernment bureaucrat is the person trying to 
help, it must be recognized that the bureau-
crat is also a Human, subject to biases.” He 
expresses his frustration that “no matter 
how many times we repeat this refrain we 
continue to be accused of ignoring it.” But 
the accusation is understandable, as they 
keep advocating government intervention. 
The best way to show that they do not 
ignore this problem is for them to advo-
cate taking large amounts of power out of 
the government’s hands. as I’ve written 
elsewhere, one way to reduce government 
power and make people more aware of 
its activities—after all, many of the prob-
lems Thaler cites are due to people’s being 
unaware—is to get rid of tax withholding. 
That way, people can be more aware of 
their tax bill, which is one of the major 
costs of government. He has not yet advo-
cated that idea.
Maybe we should nudge him.
Complexity and  
Command-and-Control
✒ Review By GeoRGe LeeF
If Middlebury College economist David Colander and theoreti-cal physicist Roland Kupers wanted to get pro-market, govern-ment minimalists like me to read their new book, then they did 
a good job of picking its title, Complexity and the Art of Public Policy. 
The idea of solving problems “from the bottom up” is an appealing
GeoRGe LeeF is director of research at the John w. Pope 
Center for Higher education Policy.
one because most public policy operates 
in the exact opposite direction, and their 
addition of “complexity” is intriguing. 
Wondering if Colander and Kupers 
would shed new light on how to reform the 
bad policies we currently endure and avoid 
adopting more of them, I dove into the 
book and soon encountered this passage: 
The standard way of doing policy con-
siders our social system as a suburban 
garden. It tills, plants, and cultivates 
as if the parts are not interrelated. for 
example, it accepts that people have 
the tastes they have, and works within 
that framework. The complexity way of 
doing policy sees everything as inter-
related; tastes are endogenous, and one 
must consider how tastes are affected 
by policy, whereas in the standard frame 
one does not.
So if we “do policy” according to their 
“complexity frame,” can we actually devise 
laws and regulations that are superior to 
the old “suburban garden” approach? 
apparently they think so; I wanted to see 
exactly how.
Revising “I, Pencil” / The authors proceed 
to tell us that humans could better solve 
their problems if policymakers would stop 
thinking in either “market fundamental-
ist” ways or in top-down, command-and-
control ways. Instead, they say, policy-
makers should adopt the more reasoned, 
mathematically based “complexity frame” 
of analysis. Hearing that “market funda-
mentalist” animadversion, I started to sus-
pect that the authors’ ideal of “complexity 
analysis” is more amenable to state power 
than to laissez-faire. 
That suspicion was confirmed in their 
chapter, “I Pencil Revisited.” Colander and 
Kupers look at leonard Read’s famous 
1958 essay and maintain that while it 
makes a useful point about the way prices 
and market competition work to coordi-
nate the production of an item nobody 
could produce on his own, it shortchanges 
the importance of government. They go 
so far as to offer this addition to Read’s 
original text: “So, to tell the complete story 
of my production, I need to include gov-
ernment, and the many other collective 
groups, such as the Pencils Producers asso-
ciation to which my family belongs, that 
assist government in its coordination role.”
Colander and Kupers suggest that the 
reason why Read didn’t mention govern-
ment in his essay was that he feared that 
including it “would lead some people to 
expand the role of government.” In this, 
they’re mistaken. Read simply figured that 
most people understood fairly well that we 
need government to protect property rights 
and settle disputes, but that very few had 
any clue at all about the amazing coordinat-
ing power of the free market. That’s why his 
“ode” extols uncoerced human cooperation 
and leaves government out. Read was not 
an opponent of government, but argued 
that it has to stick to its rights-protecting, 
order-keeping functions. If it does so, then 
the market works to produce pencils and all 
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